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We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment.
In our model, banks make loans, securitize these loans, trade in them, or hold cash.  They can also
borrow money, using their security holdings as collateral.  We embed such banks in a stylized financial
market, in which securitized loans may be mispriced, and investigate how banks allocate limited capital
among the various activities, as well as how they choose their capital structure.  Banks maximize profits,
and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors.  The theory explains
the cyclical behavior of credit and investment, but also accounts for the fundamental instability of
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  We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced 
by investor sentiment.  In our model, banks make loans, securitize these loans, trade in 
them, or hold cash.  They can also borrow money, using their security holdings as 
collateral.  We embed such banks in a stylized financial market, in which securitized 
loans may be mispriced, and investigate how banks allocate limited capital among the 
various activities, as well as how they choose their capital structure.   Banks maximize 
profits, and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors.  
The theory explains the cyclical behavior of credit and investment, but also accounts for 
the fundamental instability of banks operating in financial markets, especially when 
banks use leverage. 
  In this model, banks that cannot securitize loans smooth their lending over time.  
When banks participate in financial markets, however, they respond to investor 
sentiment.  Banks use their scarce capital to co-invest in newly securitized loans when 
asset prices are high, and to buy or hold onto distressed securities when asset prices are 
low.  Expanding the balance sheet to securitize is so profitable in good times, however, 
that banks borrow short term and accept the risk of having to liquidate their portfolio 
holdings at below fundamental values in bad times.  Such liquidations further destabilize 
security prices.  By stretching their balance sheets to the limit in good times, banks give 
up the opportunity to finance investment or buy distressed assets in bad times.  
Under these circumstances, bank profits and balance sheets, as well as real 
investment, are highly cyclical.  Investment is strictly higher with securitization than 
without it, but may be distorted in favor of projects available for securitization during 
  2bubbles.  This can reduce efficiency even without any costs of cyclical fluctuations.  The 
central message is that financial intermediation transmits security market fluctuations into 
the real economy; the volatility of sentiment turns into the volatility of real activity
2. 
 Our paper is related to three broad strands of research, including work on the 
microfoundations of credit cyclicality begun by Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
3, work on 
asset liquidity, fire sales, and limited arbitrage starting with Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 
1997), and work in behavioral corporate finance, initiated by DeLong et al. (1989) and 
Stein (1996).   We attempt to unify these three strands by focusing on the role of banks in 
transmitting market fluctuations into the real economy.   
The literature on the microfoundations of credit cycles primarily focuses on the 
magnification of shocks to the value of capital and their impact on credit through 
collateral and incentive compatibility constraints
4.   This approach is taken in Bernanke-
Gertler (1989), Holmstrom-Tirole (1997), Kiyotaki-Moore (1997), and Fostel and 
Geanakoplos (2008).  Our emphasis on investor sentiment and the dynamic incentives of 
financial intermediaries is quite different.  Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show how asset 
liquidity, high debt capacity, and easy credit are mutually reinforcing.  Benmelech and 
Bergman (2009) present a multiple equilibrium model in which high collateral values, 
high liquidity, and high debt capacity go together.  Adrian and Shin (2009) document the 
pro-cyclicality of leverage empirically using data on broker-dealers. Allen and Gale 
(2000) model an asset market bubble fueled by unexpectedly loose monetary policy.   
Adrian and Shin (2008) put forward a theory of procyclical leverage and credit 
availability based on the optimizing behavior of financial intermediaries.  In their model, 
                                                 
2 A different view of the interaction of markets and financial intermediaries is Allen and Gale (1997). 
3 An older literature on cyclical credit includes Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1986).   
4 The foundational work on optimal debt contracts, first written in 1989, is Hart and Moore (1998). 
  3procyclical leverage comes from the focus of investment banks on Value-at-Risk.  Adrian 
and Shin argue that volatility is countercyclical, allowing banks to take more leveraged 
bets when asset prices are high.   Rajan (2006) stresses the role of agency problems 
within financial firms, distorted compensation structures, and the difficulty of 
understanding the riskiness of complex financial instruments in generating procyclical 
risk-taking.  Unlike Adrian-Shin (2008) and Rajan (2006), we do not focus on the banks’ 
incentives for risk-taking, but rather address the ways that banks can profit from changes 
in investor sentiment and their consequences for capital allocation over time. 
   Our paper is also related to the literature on asset liquidity, fire sales and limited 
arbitrage.  Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show how asset illiquidity, defined as the inability 
to sell an asset for its value in best use, results from the simultaneous debt overhang 
facing all of the specialist buyers in a given industry.   Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show 
how asset prices fall below fundamental values when intermediaries involved in arbitrage 
lose the capital of uninformed investors after poor performance.  Arbitrageurs liquidate 
their positions in a crisis, rather than stabilize prices.  Gromb and Vayanos (2002) find 
that arbitrageurs’ trades do not optimally stabilize asset prices.  Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) show how declines in asset values lead to increases in margins and fire 
sales of assets that cause further declines in asset values. They label these self-reinforcing 
dynamics the margin and loss spirals.  He and Krishnamurthy (2008) examine the asset 
pricing implications of shocks to financial intermediaries.  Acharya, Gale, and 
Yorulmazer (2009) describe how the market for rollover debt, such as asset-backed 
commercial paper, may experience sudden freezes.  Diamond and Rajan (2009) show 
how the fear of future fire sales keeps banks from lending.    
  4Finally, our paper is related to the extensive literature on behavioral corporate 
finance.   Baker and Wurgler (2002, 2004) show how firms cater to investor sentiment 
through their dividend and capital structure policies.  We use related ideas to understand 
the behavior of banks.  Of particular relevance in this literature is the relationship 
between the mispricing of assets and the real investment by firms, an issue made 
prominent by Keynes (1936) and analyzed explicitly by Stein (1996).  Baker, Ruback, 
and Wurgler (2007) identify two strands of evidence on this issue.  An earlier strand 
investigated whether investment is sensitive to stock prices over and above the direct 
measures of marginal product of capital.  The results of these studies have been mixed.
5 
The more recent empirical studies identify episodes of mispricing directly using proxies.  
These papers find stronger evidence of the effect of mispricing on real investment.
6  
Another question is whether the impact of mispricing on real investment is good 
or bad for efficiency (see De Long et al. 1989).  Farhi and Panageas (2006) conclude that 
while overvaluation can lead to negative NPV investments, it may also help overcome the 
underinvestment problem stemming from financial constraints.  Ventura (2003) and Farhi 
and Tirole (2008) come to similar conclusions in models with rational bubbles.   
In reviewing all this research, we have not uncovered any work that focuses on 
the specific role played by banks in transmitting the fluctuations in investor sentiment 
into the real economy.  Likewise, in the thorough survey of financial intermediation by 
Gorton and Winton (2003), there is little discussion of the role of investor sentiment.   
                                                 
5 Barro (1990) finds that stock prices exert a strong independent influence on investment. Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1990) and Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) find that the effect of stock prices on 
investment is small after controlling for fundamental determinants of marginal profitability of investment. 
6 See, e.g., Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Lamont and Stein (2006), and Polk and Sapienza (2009).   
  5  In Section 2, we present our model.   Section 3 considers the case in which banks 
can participate in financial markets by securitizing loans, but cannot borrow.  Many of 
our central results emerge in this simplified case.  Section 4 examines what happens 
when banks can borrow and further expand their balance sheets when they face good 
opportunities.   Many of our findings on instability become more extreme.   Section 5 
focuses on the endogenous determination of security prices.  It shows that bank instability 
is closely associated with financial market instability, and that the two reinforce each 
other.   Section 6 brings the findings together by considering the possible relevance of our 
results for the current financial crisis, as well as for appropriate policy interventions. 
 
      
2: The model 
  We consider a model with three periods: 1, 2, and 3.   The model is highly 
stylized, in that we do not derive optimal financial contracts, but rather rely on previous 
work to assume a reduced form version of these contracts.  We then investigate the 
consequences of such contracts for market equilibrium.  For stark focus, we examine the 
model with no fundamental risk to investment, and the risk-free interest rate of zero. 
  
Projects 
Real activity in the model consists of projects, which become available in periods 
1 and 2, and all pay off in period 3.   Each project costs $1 to undertake.  Through most 
of the paper, we consider identical projects.  When started at t=1, these projects pay off a 
known amount Z > 1 in t=3 for certain.   When started at t=2, these projects pay off the 
  6same known amount Z in the same t=3 for certain.   The only reason to have both period 
1 and period 2 projects pay off in period 3 is to avoid having period 4.  Period 1 projects 
are long term, and do not pay off until time 3.   The supply of projects costing $1 and 
yielding Z > 1 is infinite, so their realization is only constrained by finance.   
  Screening or monitoring by an informed intermediary is required to separate these 
projects from the bad ones with Z < 1.  All projects must therefore be financed by banks.  
When a bank finances a $1 project, it collects an up-front fee f from the entrepreneur, and 
a certain repayment of $1 at t=3.  We assume that the entrepreneur and the bank split the 
surplus from the project, so  (1 fZ ) α =⋅ − with 01 α ≤ ≤ .  For simplicity, we assume that 
the entrepreneur pays the fee from his personal funds.    
We occasionally consider the case where, at both time 1 and time 2, the projects 
are not all identical, but there are high (H) and low (L) projects, which all cost the same 
$1, but pay off   and  H L Z Z  with  and  LH LH Z Zf f < < . We assume that the number of high 
projects is limited to  H N  each period, but that the supply of low projects is infinite.    
 
Banks 
All financing in the model is done by banks.  The representative bank comes into 
period 1 with   in equity.   We do not consider deposits, or bank runs by depositors as 
in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), although these could be added.   Let   be the number 
of new projects the bank finances at time t, with t=1, 2.  Let   be the bank’s equity at 





  7The bank can use its resources in several ways.  First, it can hold cash.  We denote 
by C the amount of cash it holds at the end of period 1.  Under our assumptions, the bank 
never chooses to hold cash at time 2 because there are no opportunities arising at time 3.  
The bank can also purchase securities, as we discuss below.  Finally, it can lend money 
for projects, in which case it collects the fee up front and receives the repayment of $1 for 
certain at time 3, since projects are assumed to be riskless and the interest rate is zero.    
The bank can do one of two things with these project loans.  It can keep them on 
its books, which we refer to as traditional lending.  Or, alternatively, the bank can 
securitize these loans and sell them off in the financial market
7.   In our model, 
securitization is simply the sale in the market of cash flow claims that would otherwise be 
held by banks.   We do not model packaging and tranching as part of securitization, so in 
our model securitization looks a lot like loan syndication.  We simply assume that each 
individual loan to a firm can be sold off in the market, and represents a claim to $1 for 
certain at time 3.  In our model, all loans are the same.  Packaging and tranching would 
amplify the effects modeled in our paper if they cater to investor demand and thereby 
improve the terms on which banks can sell securities or borrow against them (because, 
for example, engineered securities are rated AAA)
8.   Such securitization would allow the 
bank to more profitably expand its balance sheet in response to market opportunities.  
Our central assumption about securitization is that when the bank sells off a loan 
in the market, it must initially keep a fraction d of the loan on its own books.  We can 
                                                 
7 We do not allow banks to securitize commitments to make future loans. 
8 In our model, one role of the banks is to identify asset classes with abnormally high demand from 
investors and then structure the loans to borrowers and the securitized cash flow claims on those loans to 
cater to investor demand.  Rather than delegate all their investment to the banks as in the model of 
Diamond (1984), investors in our model have definite preferences over assets.  Presumably, this is because 
they are mostly institutions themselves and are run by professionals with investment expertise.  
  8think of d as the bank’s necessary initial skin in the game when it securitizes loans.  If N 
projects are financed and the corresponding loans are securitized, the bank must hold dN 
of these securities on its balance sheet at the time of the underwriting.  We assume that 
the bank does not need to hold on to these securities for more than one period.   
We do not derive d from first principles, but a substantial literature justifies this 
assumption.  Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) ask: when would outside investors be willing 
to buy loans from banks with presumably superior information?  In their model, incentive 
compatible contracts involve the bank retaining a portion of the loan or else guaranteeing 
the loan against default.  The authors then test this model using data on actual loan sales 
contracts.  They find that the most common arrangement involves the bank retaining a 
portion of all loans that are sold to outside investors and that this portion is greater for 
riskier categories of loans.  Sufi (2007) provides more recent corroborative evidence for 
the skin in the game assumption using data from the syndicated loan market.  Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1997) derive conditions under which outside investors will lend alongside 
banks on more favorable terms than they would without bank participation.  The optimal 
incentive compatible contract involves the bank retaining a minimum fraction of the loan 
so that it has sufficient incentive to monitor the borrower. 
These papers support our assumption that banks must have "skin in the game" by 
retaining a minimum fraction of loans sold to outside investors.   Of course, more 
complex implicit contractual arrangements are also common, as discussed by Gorton and 
Souleles (2007) in the case or credit card securitizations and by Brunnermeier (2009) 
with respect to liquidity backstops provided by sponsors of Structured Investment 
Vehicles (SIVs).  But d can serve as a summary measure of these arrangements.   
  9Empirically, required skin in the game may be lower when asset prices are high, possibly 
because investors are less cautious about information asymmetries and agency problems 
when they are optimistic. This alternative assumption would only strengthen our results.  
When the bank securitizes a loan, it can sell the securities it does not retain in the 
market.  We denote by   with t= 1,2 the price of the securities are time t.  In the case of 
identical projects, all securities are obviously identical.  Even with heterogeneous 
projects, we can assume that security prices are all identical, since each security 
corresponds to a loan of $1 that pays off $1 for sure at time 3, regardless of the project. 
t P
Prices of securitized debt can deviate from the rational price of 1 because of 
investor sentiment.  We assume that sentiment affects all securitized debt by the same 
amount, but do not consider inefficiencies in other markets such as bank stocks.   
Although sentiment here affects one particular asset class (securitized debt), it can come 
from a variety of sources, such as shifts in psychology, regulatory rules, or otherwise 
fundamental payoff-unrelated demand for a particular asset class.  For example, if some 
investors such as insurance companies or money market funds demand AAA-rated bonds 
for reasons beyond the fundamental economics of payoffs, and are willing to pay 
substantially more for such bonds than for almost equally safe bonds, we think of this as 
investor sentiment.  Such demand can be fueled by loose monetary policy, which lowers 
risk-free rates and may cause investors seeking yields to overpay for higher yielding 
securities still perceived to be safe.  Demand can also be boosted by evidence of a 
favorable recent default history, as when Drexel sold large amounts of high-yield 
corporate bonds in the LBO boom of the 1980s (Kaplan and Stein 1993), or when house 
price appreciation made mortgage defaults relatively rare.  At the other end of the 
  10spectrum, bad fundamental news can cause investors to dump securities when they lose 
confidence in their valuation models (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2008).  
Until Section 5, we take security prices as exogenous, on the assumption that 
arbitrage is limited and does not drive those prices to the fundamental value of 1 
(DeLong et. al 1990, Shleifer and Vishny 1997).   We abstract from uncertainty about 
future security prices because it is not central to our main points.  Indeed, a bank 
uncertain of when security prices will fall might be even more willing to originate loans 
at time 1.  For simplicity, we focus on the case in which  2 PP 1 <  (and in particular   > 1 
and   < 1), and the bank actually knows  .  We are thus looking for conditions under 
which the bank expands its balance sheet at time 1 even when it knows that good times 
are about to end.  We assume that the bank understands the model, including the fact that 
the fundamental value of securities is 1 at all times (recall that the interest rate is zero)
1 P
2 P 2 P
9.  
  The bank has an incentive to securitize loans only if f > 1 -  , since it needs to 
supply $1 to the entrepreneur.  We assume that the banks collect nothing in fees from 
security buyers, so that from the point of view of fee collection, securitization and 
traditional lending are identical per loan.  We also assume, to simplify matters, that when 
the bank sells loans at a price   > 1, it collects profits ( -1)(1-d) per loan from security 
buyers, and immediately distributes these profits, as well as the fees obtained from the 
entrepreneurs, as dividends or employee compensation. 
1 P
1 P 1 P
This is a strong assumption, since retaining profits would enable the bank to buy 
underpriced securities, or avoid liquidation, at time 2.  Nonetheless, we think it is 
                                                 
9 We can alternatively model banks as having adaptive expectations and learning quickly that loans can be 
resold at prices at or above their face values.   Such banks need not have perfect foresight, but simply not 
expect to lose too much money should market conditions deteriorate.  The banks in our model are much 
more cautious, in that they both foresee the price decline at time 2, and recognize its economic effects.     
  11appropriate.   First, competitive pressures, in particular those for key employees, might 
force the banks to distribute a large share of profits as compensation.   Second, perhaps as 
importantly, if the bank retains profits, its profit-maximizing policy, as we show below, is 
not to keep them in cash, but instead to instantaneously recycle them to finance and 
securitize additional projects.  For tractability, we do not allow for such recycling of 
profits within a period.  The key point is that profit-maximizing banks will not retain 
profits as a safety cushion in our model, which contributes to instability.   
  Just  as  the  bank  can  profitably underwrite and sell securities when prices are at 
least equal to 1, the bank that has capital can buy securities.  We are interested in the case 
in which  , so it might be in the interest of the bank to buy securities at t=2, which  
pay off $1 at t=3.   We also need to consider, for this reason, the question of whether the 
bank wants to hoard cash at time 1 so as to be able to buy securities in distressed markets.   
2 1 P <
  The final question is how the bank finances its operations, in addition to its equity 
cushion (recall that we do not have deposits in the model).  Our central assumption is that 
the bank can borrow in financial markets using the securities it holds as collateral.   We 
denote by  the stock of short term borrowing by the bank from the market at time t=1, 
2.   Because the lending is collateralized, we assume that the lenders always liquidate 
collateral quickly enough to be left whole, so these loans are safe and bear the interest 
rate of zero.  To keep themselves safe, lenders to the bank insist that at all times it must 
maintain a haircut h in the form of securities on its debt; that is,  .  
We take h to be constant.  If, as argued by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Adrian 
and Shin (2009), haircuts are countercyclical, the instability described in our paper 
becomes more extreme.    
t L
 = (1-h) collateral t L ⋅
  12Our specification of h captures the kind of short-term collateralized borrowing 
arrangements, such as asset-backed commercial paper and repo transactions, which have 
become increasingly prevalent (see Adrian and Shin 2008, 2009 and Gorton 2008).  In 
these transactions, banks often borrow on a safe haircut that allows lenders to liquidate 
the collateral before its value falls below the value of the loan.   Consistent with 
Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992), securitization encourages this type of 
borrowing by making the assets retained on bank balance sheets more liquid and 
redeployable, thereby supporting higher leverage.  Indeed, an important side benefit of 
“true” securitization, with packaging and tranching, is that AAA securities can be used as 
collateral with very low haircuts.  Both security buyers such as leveraged hedge funds 
and banks underwriting securities benefit from low haircuts.  
Because the market prices and liquidity of securities fluctuate over time, the 
collateralized lending arrangements are typically short-term.  Any borrower seeking to 
make these loans longer term would presumably have to accept a higher haircut, thereby 
decreasing its debt capacity (as well as pay higher interest rates if there is a risk of 
default).  Long term debt would thus be more expensive.  An alternative view is that short 
term debt is a disciplinary device against agency problems (Diamond and Rajan 2001).  
We suggest instead that banks borrow short term because of redeployable mark-to-market 
collateral created by securitization, and the profitability of borrowing and securitizing as 
much as possible in the boom.   We also assume, but do not model explicitly, that banks 
choose not to raise equity at time 2, perhaps for the usual adverse selection reasons.  
The principal consequences of bank borrowing in our model is that, should the 
price of securities fall at time 2, the bank might have to liquidate some of its portfolio of 
  13securities to maintain the haircut.   We denote by S the number of securities the bank sells 
at time 2.  Of course, we also need to consider the case in which the bank chooses to buy 
more securities at time 2, in which case S < 0.  Security liquidations can quickly wipe out 
the bank’s equity (remember the lenders to the bank never lose money), but also create 
downward price spirals in securities.  As we show below, although securitization makes 
banking highly cyclical even without leverage, leverage exacerbates the volatility.   
 
 
Organization of the paper 
In section 3, we consider the case of h=1, so  12 0 LL = =
1 1 P
; the bank cannot borrow 
in the market.   We compare d=1, which corresponds to traditional lending where the 
bank keeps the loans on its books, with d<1, which refers to securitization.  We ask when 
it pays the bank to finance everything it can at t=1 and save no cash, even when more 
high projects become available at t=2.   We start with  = , but then turn to  .  1 1 P >
In section 4, we consider the case of h<1, so the bank can borrow in the market to 
expand its activities.  In this case, we examine the liquidation of the securities portfolio at 
t=2 when  .  We again look at both  = 1 and the bubble, with  > 1.  In section 5, 
we examine the endogenous determination of .  
2 1 P < 1 P 1 P
2 P
  Throughout the paper, we use a numerical example with d = .2, h = .2,   = 1.1, 
 = .9, f = 
1 P
2 P H f = .09,  L f  = .08.   We assume a relatively high h because we are thinking 
of relatively long periods and lending against risky securities, such as mortgages. 
 
   
 
  143: Securitization without Bank Leverage   
  In this section, we consider the case of no bank leverage: 1 h = ,  .   We first 
deal with the case of , so there are no speculative gains to the bank from 
underwriting securities.  To illustrate the main ideas, we also assume that the bank knows 
that security prices will fall below 1 at t=2, and even knows the exact value of    < 1.   
We are interested in understanding under what circumstances the bank uses its balance 
sheet to finance securitization even when it knows that the good times will not last and 
the market will shortly crash.   
0 L =
1 1 P =
2 P
 
Traditional lending: d=1.  
  To fix ideas, we begin with the case of traditional lending, in which the bank 
cannot sell off project loans in the market.  Suppose all projects available at t=1 and t=2 
are identical.  If the bank uses all of its balance sheet in period 1, it lends out all of   to 
finance   projects, and keeps all of them on its books.  The bank collects   as 
fees, and distributes these profits as dividends (or employee compensation).  Since the 
interest rate is equal to zero, however, it costs the bank nothing to save up half of its 
capital until t=2, finance half of the projects, and collect half of the fees, in period 2.  
Regardless of how the bank spreads out its financing, it gets its money back at t=3.   The 
central point is that, as we have set up the model, there is no reason for cyclicality of 
traditional lending.  If we assume (as we do a bit later) that there is a limited number of 





Securitization d<1  
  15  Now suppose that the bank can securitize its loans.  Then, if it uses up all of its 




=  projects, and keep  0 dN E =  in securities on its 






> , so the number of projects financed, and 






.  The bank has greatly 
increased its profitability through securitization.  At time 2, security holders and the bank 
suffer capital losses if  .  But these losses lead to no liquidation and are 
economically irrelevant.  Everyone can wait until t=3, to collect $1 per loan.  The bank 
suffers equity erosion at t=2, but it is inconsequential.  
2 1 P <
  We need three additional conditions.  First, the bank must not want to securitize at 
t=2 when .  Second, the bank must not want to sell its securities at   and use the 
proceeds for lending to new projects.  The condition for the bank not to sell at t=2 is 







> , which means that keeping securities for capital gains at t=3 is more profitable 
than selling them and collecting fees from new firms
10.  Note that  2 1 f P < −  is sufficient 
for both of these to hold, and they hold in our example.  Third, we need to check that the 
bank does not wish to hoard cash at t=1 to invest in undervalued securities at t=2; we 
work out the condition for this to be the case below.   
  If the bank does not want to wait when it expects securitization opportunities to 
evaporate, it uses – even in this simple example – all of its balance sheet to make 
securitized loans in period 1.  Indeed, there is no new investment at time 2.  As a 
                                                 
10 It may even be the case that, due to the scarcity of capital, f in period 2 is higher than in period 1, and 
involves giving the bank all of the surplus.  This would make the sufficient condition be f =Z-1 < 1 -  .  2 P
  16consequence, the bank earns all of its fees at time 1, and none at time 2.  In the model as 
we have specified it so far, such extremely cyclical activity is efficient, since projects add 
social value, and the more of them are financed, the better.  Securitization makes the 
bank’s profits, as well as real investment, more cyclical than traditional lending, but the 
benefit of such cyclicality is more activity.  Below we show that this efficiency 
conclusion is not general, however. 
With the bank holding on to its securities at t=2, its balance sheet is cyclical in so 
far as security prices fluctuate, and the portfolio is marked to market.  But there is no 
particular economic reason to mark the portfolio to market, since the value of the 
portfolio serves no economic function without bank leverage.   We next consider the 
robustness of this simple example to several perturbations.  
 
Heterogeneous Projects:  
  With identical projects, there is no reason for the bank to smooth its financing, so 
securitization creates strong pressures for cyclicality.  Suppose, alternatively, that the 
bank has access to some high payoff projects every period, but not enough so it can stick 
to only funding those at time 1.  Will it pay the bank to wait with some cash until t=2 
when more high payoff projects become available? 
 When  d=1 and there is no securitization, the bank will smooth its investments to 
benefit from good projects that become available for financing in period 2.  Recall that 




 high projects each period – complete smoothing.  If  0 2 H EN > , the bank will finance 
all high projects, and some low projects, each period, again complete smoothing.  (More 
  17accurately for the second case, the bank will always smooth high projects and is 
indifferent to smoothing low projects.)  
 Suppose  d<1 and there is securitization at t=1,  0 2 H EN > , and  < 1 -  2 P H f  , so the 
bank does not want to securitize at t=2.   If the bank does not save  H N  until t=2 and 
instead finances and securitizes everything it can at t=1, then its profits are given by: 
0
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  The condition for the bank using all of its balance sheet to lend to projects at t=1, 
and saving up nothing for t=2, becomes: 
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Unless high projects are hugely better than low ones, this condition is likely to hold.  The 
benefits from funding more projects through securitization are so high that the bank 
foregoes funding some good ones in bad times.   
  The bank’s policy obviously makes investment more cyclical than with d=1, but 






> .  So if  1 LL fZ = −  and   (bank 
extracts all surplus from firms), cyclical investment is efficient.   It is true that some high 
projects are given up at time 2, but so many more low projects are financed at time 1, 
1 HH fZ =−
  18when securitization opportunities are available, that the cyclicality is efficient.  The 
efficiency result comes from the alignment of the bank’s profitability and social 
efficiency, which is special to the case of  1 1 P =  and breaks down when , as we 
discuss below.  With cyclical investment, the profits of the bank are enormously cyclical, 
since it collects all its fees in the first period, and none in the second.   The balance sheet 
of the bank is, as before, cyclical because prices of securities fluctuate and fall in the 
second period.  However, without leverage, the number of securities on the bank’s books 
could as well be constant over time, so there is no cycle there.   
1 1 P >
Saving for Tomorrow 
  A key question to address to complete the description of equilibrium is whether 
banks would hoard some cash for the future at t=1 when they expect security prices to 
fall, so that they can buy undervalued securities.   Continue to assume that the bank 
knows that  , and ask under what conditions it nonetheless commits all capital to 
securitization at t=1.  We go back to the case of homogeneous projects.  
2 1 P <




= f . 
If the bank saves cash C for the second period and invests it in undervalued securities, 
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  19The profit function in this model is linear in C, so the bank is always at a corner, with 
either C=0 or C= .   It either saves everything or nothing.    0 E
  In our model, the condition for not hoarding cash is likely to hold, since d is small 
and   is only slightly below 1. So if, as in our numerical example,  =.9, f=.09, d=.2, 
then 












≈ .  There is a strict preference for not holding cash as long 
as prices are not expected to crash.  The bank takes full advantage of securitization and 
does not leave any gunpowder dry.   Putting this and the previous results together, the 
model suggests that because securitization profits are so high, the bank does not save 
money for the future to either finance projects or to invest in undervalued securities.  It 
extends itself to the maximum and uses its balance sheet for securitization.  This is not a 
consequence of herding or irrationality, but rather of enormous liquidity in the market.  
The times are so good that the bank wants to expand its balance sheet to the maximum, 
and fund as many projects as it can as fast as it can.  
  This analysis has a number of implications.  First, it shows how investor 
sentiment, through securitization, infects banking and leads to cyclicality of profits, of 
investment, and at least of the market value of the balance sheet.  Banks use up all their 
capital in booms knowing full well that a crisis will come and that they will suffer (at 
least book) losses.  But they realize that there is so much money to be made during 
booms that they should nonetheless extend themselves fully.   
  Second, we can ask what happens if an unanticipated $1 of equity is injected into 
the bank at t=2, so it all of a sudden has $1 of spare capacity.  In this case, the return from 








.  The bank 
  20will commit the extra dollar to whichever one is more profitable, and we have assumed 
that it is more profitable in bad times to invest in securities than to lend directly.   
  This observation has a major implication: if the dislocation of asset prices is 
severe enough, the bank allocates the capital windfall to buying underpriced securities – 
no capital flows to new investment.  This will continue happening until security prices 
stabilize.  When the markets are dislocated, the rational strategy of the bank is to engage 
in proprietary trading rather than to finance real investment.   
 
Bubbles 
  We finally consider what happens when  .  Suppose that the bank finances 
and securitizes all the projects it can.  It must keep Nd securities as skin in the game, so   
1 1 P >
0 Nd E = .   Without leverage, the bank makes no gains from high security prices in terms 
of expanding its balance sheet.  However, period 1 distributed profits are now given by: 
1 (1 ) ( 1) Pd N −− + N f , which is higher than Nf  when  .   1 1 P ≥
  The incentives to save cash for undervalued assets, or to wait for the next round of 
good projects, are now even weaker than before. There is even more cyclicality of profits 
and balance sheet because of the greater fluctuation in prices over time.  There are still no 
economic consequences of the decline in the balance sheet at time 2, however. 
  Perhaps the most interesting change in the model with bubbles concerns the 
efficiency of investment.  Suppose that there are two kinds of projects each period: high 
ones with   (and a positive fee) and low ones with  1 H Z > 1 L Z =  (and a zero fee), and that 
the high ones are in limited supply.  The assumption that low projects are zero net present 
value is made only to illustrate the point starkly.  Suppose that all loans – for both high 
  21and low projects -- can be securitized at t=1 and sold off at  , but that the price falls 
below 1 at time 2.  So long as   is high enough, it pays the bank to use all of its balance 
sheet for securitization at time 1, including funding the low projects, and to make no 
loans at time 2, including to the high projects.   This is clearly less efficient from the 
social viewpoint than smoothing the financing over time, at least to the point where all 
the high projects are financed.  In this model, bubbles break the link between social 
efficiency and bank profits, and hence create an inter-temporal distortion in favor of 
excessive financing of less attractive projects during booms.  
1 1 P >
1 P
  This distortion becomes even larger if projects vary by the amount of skin in the 
game they require for securitization, and if some efficient projects also happen to have 
high  d’s.  For example, some corporate loans, while financing particularly socially 
desirable investments, might be harder to securitize than some more homogeneous loans.  
In this case, bubbles again create a bias toward financing securitizable investments, and 
hence can lead to distortions.  Indeed, with a shortage of securitizable projects, we can 
have Z < 1 and still the project is financed when   is sufficiently above 1.  This would 




  The analysis without bank leverage yields five significant conclusions: 
1)  Relative to direct lending, securitization raises the level of investment, but also its 
cyclicality, as well as that of balance sheets and profits.  It transmits fluctuations 
in investor sentiment into the real economy through the banking sector.   
  222)  There is a built in bias toward funding projects that can be securitized at favorable 
prices, and away from projects that cannot be securitized as easily (either because 
they come up in bad times or because they require the banks to hold more skin in 
the game).  With bubbles, this leads to inefficiencies in what is being financed.   
These inefficiencies may outweigh the welfare gains from securitization.  
3)  Banks rationally pursue profits in booms, and accept book losses in busts, because 
money making opportunities in booms are so attractive. 
4)  In busts, banks hold on to securities because of expected capital gains, rather than 
liquidate them and make fresh loans to new projects.  
5)  Attempts to help out banks in bad times may help stabilize asset prices, but not 
real investment.   Banks will engage in proprietary trading, not lending, until the 
price of distressed assets comes close enough to fundamental value.   
 
4: Securitization and Investment with Leveraged Banks 
  Suppose that the bank holding securities can borrow in the market using them as 
collateral.  We assume that the debt is short term, and security prices do not move too 
fast, so lenders can always liquidate the collateral fast enough to be repaid in full.   In this 
case, the interest rate on the debt is zero.  The mechanism of making the debt safe is the 
haircut h which the borrower must meet for the loan to stay in place.  When the bank 
commits all of its resources, i.e., all of its debt and equity, at time 1 to security holdings 
(to be used as collateral), the definition of the haircut implies that: 
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> .                                 (6) 
When the period 2 price falls, securities must be liquidated to maintain the haircut.  
  We begin with   again, and consider what happens if the bank expands its 
balance sheet to the maximum, i.e., does not hoard any cash for t=2.   We later provide 
the conditions for this to be the profit-maximizing policy for the bank.  
1 1 P =
  If the bank uses up its entire balance sheet, which now consists of both equity and 
short term debt, for securitization purposes, the skin in the game condition with    is:  1 1 P =
01 ELN d + =                                                           (7) 
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=  and the loan is  1 (1 ) collateral Lh = − i . 
  Equation (9) captures the fundamental mechanisms of balance sheet expansion in 
our model.  The bank finances 1/dh times its equity in projects.  To use our numerical 
example, if h = .2 and d = .2, then the bank finances 25 times its equity value in projects, 
has a balance sheet of 5 times its equity value, and has the debt equity ratio of  4.  With a 
lower h, these numbers become higher.   
  24  Consider next what happens at t=2, when prices fall and   - f.  The bank 
obviously cannot finance loans by issuing securities.   Indeed, to maintain the haircut, the 
bank now needs to sell securities.  Suppose it sells S securities, so it holds 
2 1 P <
Nd S −  
securities valued at   at the end of period 2.  It uses the proceeds from selling 
securities to repay   of its loan, so it still owes 
2 ( Nd S P −
2 PS
)
21 2 LL P S = −  to the lenders.   Since all 
the losses on the securities come from the bank’s equity (lenders are at no risk), we can 
compute the resulting equity and haircut: 
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If we plug in 
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⋅  of its portfolio.  When h=1, there is no 
liquidation.  When  , the bank must liquidate everything, so assume , 
i.e. the creditors have not yet liquidated the entire portfolio.  
2 1 P =− h 2 1 Ph ≥−
There are several points to notice about the expression for S.  The bank unwinds 
its portfolio very rapidly as the price falls.  If h rises in bad times, it unwinds the portfolio 
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When the haircut h is smaller, liquidation proceeds more quickly because leverage is 
higher.   So if period 1 was one of very liquid markets, with low haircuts, we expect to 
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2 <                                              (14) 
The larger is the price shock at time 2, the faster is the liquidation.  Recall that we are 
only looking at modest price shocks, and do not consider large (unanticipated) shocks 
that precipitate complete liquidation and might even entail losses to the lenders.  
  Leverage changes the situation dramatically relative to the case with no leverage.  
So long as the full commitment of the balance sheet is an equilibrium, which it is under 
conditions discussed below, leverage only increases the cyclicality of real investment.   
But now, the bank actually liquidates a part of its portfolio when security prices fall.  This 
means that banks destabilize security prices by selling into a falling market.  Moreover, 
the smaller is the haircut, the bigger is liquidation and this destabilizing role.   In section 
5, we consider the endogenous determination of security prices. 
  The model illustrates the crucial maturity mismatch.   Banks borrow short term to 
underwrite securities that finance long term projects.  With mark to market accounting, 
they might not be able to maintain those investments on their books should the sentiment 
decline.  Banks wish to hold on to these undervalued securities, but they are forced to 
liquidate by creditors.  Recall that the efficient thing to do would be for the banks to sell 
  26their security holdings and finance new investments.  But securities are underpriced, and 
the banks would rather own more than they can; they surely do not want to lend to firms.  
  We next need to establish the conditions under which full commitment of capital 
to securitization is equilibrium.  We continue to assume that , so liquidation 
keeps the loan safe.  The first question is what happens with heterogeneous projects, and 
in particular whether good projects at t=2 are sacrificed to securitization.  To get at that, 
we compare the profit generated by using a dollar to make securitized loans to low 
projects at t=1 to the profit generated by using that dollar to make unsecuritized loans to 
high projects at t=2.   
2 1 P >− h
  If the bank spends $1 to make securitized loans to low projects at t=1, it finances 
1
dh
 projects, holds 
1
h
of these projects on its books, and collects a fee of 
L f
dh
.  At t=2, it 
must sell the fraction 
2
2
1 1 P h
hP
− −
 of its portfolio at a loss ( ) 2 1 P −  to meet the haircut, 
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) −                                         (15) 
If  the bank instead uses the dollar to make unsecuritized loans to high projects at t=2, 
then it finances 
1
h
 such projects and collects an up front fee of 
H f
h
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  The advantage of doing everything right away now diminishes by the term in 
curly brackets.  The reason is that the bank might not be able to sustain its position 
through the price decline, and have to liquidate it at disadvantageous prices before the 
loan is paid off for certain at time 3.   Because the bank might have to liquidate some or 
all of its position, it is now more attractive to wait even though the benefit of financing 
new good projects is unchanged at time 2.  We can try to calibrate this equation.  If the 
price does not fall too much, this additional term is small, and so it is still likely that there 
are strong incentives to go all the way at t=1.  In particular, this equation holds for our 
parameter values.  Bank borrowing thus leads to an even greater expansion of balance 
sheet at time 1 than before, and even more extreme volatility of investment.   
  We also need to check whether banks hoard cash so they could invest it during the 
slump.  To do this, we compare the profit generated by using a dollar to make securitized 
loans to finance projects at t=1 to the profit generated by using that dollar to buy 











t=2, it must sell fraction 
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 of its portfolio at loss ( ) 2 1 P − to meet the haircut, 












⎝⎠          
.  Thus, on net, it generates a profit 









dh h h P
⎛⎞ − −
− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠            
−                                      (17) 







⎟  underpriced 
securities, yielding a profit 





⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
                                               (18) 
Comparing the two levels of profits yields the no hoarding cash condition: 
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  This is a very similar condition to the one before.  It is now more attractive than 
before to retain cash, because while the benefit of cash is the same, the cost of investing 
fully at t=1 is higher since the position might not be carried to full maturity.  Nonetheless, 
to the extent that the incremental term is small, the bank might still retain no cash.   In 
particular, the condition holds for our parameter values.   
  Are these conditions plausible?  Recall that the bank’s profit function is linear in 
retained cash, so it always retains everything or nothing, i.e., is at a corner.  As long as 
the bank does not expect a massive price collapse, it keeps no cash.  The benefits of 
committing the entire balance sheet to securitization in terms of immediate profits are 
only enhanced by leverage. 
  These conditions also shed light on the reason why banks oppose mark to market 
accounting.  In this model, banks are forced to liquidate their positions by creditors when 
they cannot meet collateral requirements even though the securities are perfectly sound if 
  29held to maturity.  The only reason for liquidation is the under-pricing of collateral in an 
inefficient market.   If there were no mark to market and collateral was never liquidated, 
banks could use their balance sheets to underwrite even more securities without fear of 
portfolio liquidation.  Absence of mark to market accounting is equivalent to extending 
the maturity of debt.  As a consequence, absence of mark to market accounting would 
generally be associated with higher leverage.  Holding haircuts constant, mark to market 
deters banks from leveraging too much, because they want to avoid liquidating collateral. 
Eliminate mark to market, banks would say, and we will finance more investment.   
This reasoning is very partial, however.  In a more general model, haircuts and 
interest rates would have to be higher when there is no mark to market collateral whose 
liquidation protects creditors.  As a consequence, banks would in fact be able to borrow 
less and finance fewer projects.  Put differently, bank leverage on good terms is only 
possible when creditors are protected by mark to market accounting.  Banks cannot have 
it both ways: they cannot simultaneously be able to borrow to expand their balance 
sheets, and rely on non-transparent accounting to hide losses.   Indeed, hedge funds can 
borrow precisely because they post liquid collateral to their lenders, and mark it to market 
so lenders can at all times ascertain the funds’ borrowing capacity.  
     
Bubbles with Leverage 
We now consider how leverage interacts with bubbles, i.e., what happens with 
?  The skin in the game condition and the haircut conditions now become:  1 1 P >
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  This equation explains how the balance sheet of the bank further expands in a 
bubble.  (Note that this condition reduces to the earlier one for  1 1 P = .)  With leverage, 





> .  The reason is that the bank retains some 
securities on its balance sheet as skin in the game, but in a bubble these securities are 
more valuable than their cost, so the bank’s equity rises.   Higher equity in turn allows the 
bank to borrow more and to finance more projects than it could with  .  1 P 1 =
  Going back to our example with h=.2, d=.2, and   = 1.1, the number of projects 
being financed is now 40 times the initial equity, the collateral is about 8 times the initial 
equity, the short term borrowing is about 7 times the initial equity, the debt equity ratio 
with mark to market accounting is 4, and the debt equity ratio with book value accounting 
1 P
  31is 7.  These numbers can be blown up substantially with a lower h.   Bubbles thus further 
increase the leverage and the balance sheet of the bank.   
Not surprisingly, the profitability of the bank now becomes even higher during 
the boom.  The bank has two types of profits at t=1. It collects Nf as fees from firms 
regardless of the mode of financing and it collects  1 (1 ) ( 1) Pd N − −  from security buyers 
when  .  If the bank distributes these profits as dividends and compensation to 
employees, it will show enormous profitability in good times.   As before, bubbles make 
it only more likely that the bank uses all of its balance sheet to finance securitization at 
t=1, even if it anticipates that some or all of its portfolio will need to be liquidated later.   
And, as before, bubbles create distortions in the financing of investments in favor of 
projects that are available for financing in booms and that are easier to securitize.  
1 1 P >
A final question to ask is what happens to liquidation at t=2 after the bubble 
collapses.  As before  
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and all of the previous comparative statics go through (h smaller, sell more;   lower, sell 









                                                       (27) 
so, fixing  , the greater the bubble at t=1 the greater the liquidation at t=2.   2 P
 
Summary 
1)  Leverage promotes a further expansion of balance sheets in boom times, and 
generally increases the cyclicality of investment and profits. 
2)  Leverage leads to liquidations of bank portfolios at prices below fundamental 
values in bad times.   
3)  The principal source of instability is securitization.  Short term borrowing makes 
it worse, and may lead to much higher price volatility (section 5).  But the 
mechanism of transmission of investor sentiment into commercial banking and 
the real economy is securitization.   
4)  The result that equity injections will not lead to any new real investment might 
only become stronger if prices fall further with leverage, as banks use fresh 
capital to pay down debt and avoid liquidating their portfolios at fire sale prices.  
 
 
  335: Determination of    2 P
  Until now, we have discussed bank instability in light of exogenous volatility of 
security prices.  But of course, bank instability and the sharp declines in security prices 
are often seen as mutually reinforcing.  To deal with this issue, we need to endogenize .   
In this section, we use a variant of the “limits of arbitrage” model of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) to endogenize prices with the banks playing the role of arbitrageurs.  The key 
assumption of that model is that there is a downward sloping demand curve for a given 
security coming from the noise traders.  The equilibrium price is determined by 
aggregating noise trader and bank demands for each security with outstanding supply. 
2 P
We focus on period 2.  We assume that there is only one type of project, and 
focus again on the equilibrium in which the bank holds no cash at the end of time 1.  We 
make a stability assumption that h > d (Shleifer-Vishny 1997 have a similar assumption), 
and continue to assume that the banks do not fully liquidate their positions at time 2: 
1 – f  >  .                                                (28)  2 1 P ≥− h
To model noise trader demand, we follow Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and assume 
that noise traders have unlimited aggregate resources, but that their demands for 
individual securities are unit elastic. So when noise traders have valuations given by 
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=  is the number of securities the bank sells at time 2.  The condition for 
noise trader shock being mild enough that (28) holds is: 
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  The price of each security is determined by equating the total demand of the 
banks and the noise traders with the total supply of each security, which is 1: 
22 22 () ()1 nP bP + =                                                     (31) 
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  Equation (33) is the expression for the endogenous equilibrium price at time 2.  
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  35   is more responsive to shocks when d is large and h is small.  When haircuts are 
small and therefore leverage is high, prices are extremely sensitive to shocks.  Leverage 
is destabilizing in this very precise sense.  Indeed, when h is close to d, as it is in our 
example, the market falls sharply in response to noise trader shocks and there is extreme 
instability.  In equilibrium, the banks will actually get out of the market.  In addition, the 
derivative of   with respect to h is positive, which means that, with more leverage 





Relationship to parameter a in SV: 
  As a final step in the analysis of the model with endogenous prices, we compare 
our results to those in Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  In that model, we did not focus on 
leverage, but rather modeled the idea that the arbitrageurs’ funds under management at 
time 2 are an increasing function of their performance between time 1 and time 2.   As a 
consequence, when noise trader pessimism deepened at time 2, arbitrageurs lost funds 
under management precisely when noise trader sentiment deteriorated.   
  Shleifer and Vishny modeled the responsiveness of funds under management to 
past performance using a parameter a, which, in the notation of our current model would 
be defined as follows (thinking of banks as arbitrageurs): 
22 2 2 ( ) (1 (1 )) Pb P d a P = −− , or                                      (35) 
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Equating these two expressions yields:  
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  This calculation offers a useful comparison of our model with Shleifer-Vishny 
(1997).  It shows that leverage, particularly with thin haircuts, leads to massively more 
instability than there was in the original model.   Recall that “a” is the parameter 
reflecting the sensitivity of funds under management to performance, with the idea that it 
was a number like 1.1 or 1.2.  If h = .2, as we assumed in our example, then the implied 
“a” in the present model becomes equal to 5, which means that liquidation spirals of 
assets are much more dramatic than in Shleifer-Vishny (1997). 
   
6:  The financial crisis and economic policy 
  In broad terms, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 can be easily outlined. The 
proximate cause of the crisis is the collapse of the housing bubble in the United States.   
The US home prices tripled between mid 1990s and 2006, and then fell spectacularly by 
perhaps some thirty percent in the last two years (Case 2008, Mayer et al. 2009).   The 
housing bubble was accompanied by a major credit expansion, particularly in the 
  37residential mortgage area, but also in corporate loans, commercial mortgages, and credit 
card finance.  Mortgages and other loans were to a very significant extent securitized, by 
pooling portfolios of loans together, tranching them into securities with different risks, 
and then selling them off (Coval et al. 2009).   Securitization was a major financial 
innovation driven largely by huge demand for AAA securities by insurance companies, 
money market funds, and other investors (Benmelech and Dlugosz 2009).  The enormous 
demand for mortgage-related securities also led to some decline in lending standards, and 
perhaps to misleading ratings of these securities by the rating agencies (Keys et al. 2008, 
Mian and Sufi 2009).  Banks were intimately involved in both underwriting these 
securities, and holding large inventories on their own books.  Banks financed these 
inventories of mortgage-related securities, at least in part, through short term borrowing.    
Thanks to these activities, bank profits and employee compensation grew spectacularly 
between 2002 and 2007.   
  As the housing bubble collapsed, mortgages began to default.  Starting in the 
summer of 2007, we saw rapid declines in prices of mortgage-related securities, including 
AAA-rated bonds often used as collateral against short term loans.   This price collapse 
effectively ended new securitization.  With rapidly falling prices, banks sold off their 
inventories of securities very slowly.  Some banks may have even increased credit risk 
exposure through derivatives such as credit default swaps and indices such as ABX.   As 
the banks maintained their exposure to mortgage-related debt, real lending declined in 
nearly all categories, and not just in areas where securitization was prevalent (Ivashina 
and Scharfstein 2008).   In 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank and then the US Treasury 
stepped into the crisis by first lending massively to banks against collateral, and then 
  38moving to equity injections (Veronesi and Zingales 2008).  These expensive rescue 
attempts did not at least initially unfreeze bank lending to businesses.  Rather, banks 
hoarded cash (in the form of deposits at the Federal Reserve) and tried to hold on to their 
inventories of securities. 
  Our model does not have anything to say about the housing bubble, but it does 
speak to every remaining key aspect of the narrative.  Perhaps most important, the model 
suggests that the banks got themselves into so much trouble not by their irrationality or 
herding instincts, but by taking advantage of extraordinary temporary profit opportunities 
afforded by securitization.  This is not to say that the banks correctly anticipated the 
depth of the crisis, and the troubles that were about to beset them (Gerardi et al 2008).   
Rather, the model suggests that liquid markets created tremendous opportunities for 
banks, and profit maximization pushed banks to take them.  This is our interpretation of 
the now-famous quote of Chuck Prince, then Chairman of Citigroup:  “When the music 
stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated.   But, as long as the music is 
playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.  We are still dancing.” (Financial Times,7/9/07). 
  From the point of view of policy analysis, the model suggests two broad themes. 
First, the model identifies a fundamental instability of universal banking. Many 
economists have recognized the cyclicality of credit/risk-taking and the use of short-term 
debt as key factors contributing to the financial crisis.  Some have attributed this behavior 
to agency problems within firms, inadequate monitoring or unhealthy competitive 
pressures to herd within the banking sector.  We show that with modern banking the 
forces pushing toward cyclical credit expansion financed by short-term debt are much 
  39stronger than previously recognized.   It will be difficult to wean the system of this 
behavior through better governance or improved regulatory capital measures.   
Second, getting the economy out of trouble is likely to require addressing not just 
the liabilities of the banks, such as long term debt, but also their assets.   So long as the 
banks continue to hold, and can choose to invest, in undervalued securities, the lending 
mechanisms will be blocked or weakened by the banks’ own choice.  This is true so long 
as securities trade at prices below their fundamental values.  Unlocking the lending 
channel will require dealing directly with bank assets and not just their liabilities.    
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